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ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW*
K. N. LLEWELLYN t
"The inquiry as to. a theory" remarks Pareto, "runs in terms of what
it did for the man who made it-and of what it did for the men who ac-
cepted it." There is rarely a lack of the theories in the world, or even in
the air-or of philosophies. Nor, for that matter, when the philosophies
die do the books die with them which contain them. But life-in-action
a theory can gain only when it serves men's needs. Life-in-action; I am
* As Pound has pointed out, the natural law thinking in which Mansfield was at home,
and which was choked out in England by Eldon's time at least, continued to flourish here. It
was Morris Cohen, I think, who made me see its recrudescence in the constitutional law cases
in and after the '9o's. Pound gives good reason for the first phenomenon; but I have never
felt satisfied with his mere listing and description of our apparently inconsistent jurispru-
dential trends in the latter x9th century. It is not enough to know what they were, and
whence they came. We must see why men adopted them, and above all, how they all fitted
into the single picture. Nor is this all. Philosophers' writings and law-men's doings meet
rarely on the same level of discourse, and part of the game is to find where they do, where
they do not, and-if you can-the why of either. Finally, wherever writings are contrasted
with doings, there is the question of the relative r6le of the great man and his times.
I grow impatient for some one to work these matters out. It is due our students that
cases with dates ranging from 178o to i93o should be given some chart of the sweep, on which
they can be plotted. How else are the individual cases to be grasped? Indeed there are a
number of finished jobs which a second year law student is entitled to have before him. Some
one should make clear to him the difference in "feel" and tendency between, say the approach
in most phases of property and a few phases of commercial law from that in the flexible body
of commercial law at large, the difference between the latter and the mutually diverse flexi-
bilities of Equity and of Torts; some one should set for him the "feel" of Procedure against
that of Public Law. I still feel my wattles grow red as I recall the shock with which, as a
dyed-in-the-wool commercial lawyer, I met property phases of mortgage law which left me
gasping. "One system of precedent" we may have, but it works in forty different ways.
Some day, some one will help the second year student orient himself. Nor does any one
bother to present to him the difference between logic and persuasion, nor what a man facing
old courts is to do with a new vocabulary; in a word, the game, in framing an argument, of
diagnosing the peculiar presuppositions of the hearers. I think the second year student is en-
titled to feel himself aggrieved. Meanwhile, while we wait upon the treading of the Angel,
there is rushing in that calls for doing. Here is a start.
t B. A., 1915, LL. B., I918, J. D., i92o, Yale; Betts Professor of Jurisprudence, Colum-
bia University School of Law; Commissioner of Uniform State Laws from New York;
author of numerous legal treatises and articles.
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less concerned here with currency-in-words. Men may scorn philoso-
phies, as philosophers are fond of making clear, without escaping the ne-
cessity of living in terms of some one of them-or of some inconsistent
hodge-podge of a dozen. Thus what is here before the telescope is the
changing array not of verbalized philosophies, but of philosophies-in-action
as the history of law in these United States has gone its way. What those
philosophies were, what needs they served-and whose. I am not so much
concerned, I repeat, with the philosophers themselves, with whom indeed
my acquaintance is but scanty. I am concerned with philosophy-in-action,
with implicit philosophy, with those premises, albeit inarticulate and in fact
unthought, which yet make coherence out of a multiplicity of single ways
of doing. Where explicit writers happen to be mentioned, it is as persons
giving fortunate expression to the living currents of their time. With an
exception. The two most recent lines of premise mentioned (the sociological
and the realistic) are found rather in writings than in life. I view them
as products of their time, as attempts to adjust action to felt needs, as were
the others. I view them also as probable heralds of the future. But of the
ways of the law-guild at large, as lived, they are as yet a most inadequate
expression.
It will thus be clear that I am viewing not the invention, but the choice
of a philosophy-or better, the growing into ways of doing which comport
with some one philosophy and not with another. And it will be clear that
I view such fitting into a philosophy as a process dependent largely on the
felt needs of the persons concerned. And it need hardly be added that I
view conscious choice of a philosophy as rare, and the mere growing into
one as the order of the day. But I trust to make it persuasive as well that
once a philosophy has been established in the habits and attitudes of any
person, it has effects; a fortiori, if such establishment comes to prevail among
a group; and again a fortiori as the group in question grows larger or more
solid. Finally, I shall urge that the inventor of a new philosophy, or of a
creative adaptation of some ancient one to current needs, may with luck
affect or deflect the current of his times. There is a certain-or better, an
uncertain-leeway within which the individual contributes to the shaping
of society. And there is a speeding or slowing (or turning) of the march
of events, according as the needed intellectual formulations are or are not
invented (or rediscovered) or are well or badly, or late or early, achieved.
A lone man, by his formulations, may indeed make felt a need of which no
one had been conscious before.
The United States began as such with natural law the atmosphere
about them. "We hold these truths to be self-evident," wrote Jefferson.
And signers signed. The separation of powers, whether derived from
Montesquieu or Reason, was surely written into the Document as an expres-
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sion of the "essential" nature of government. The Bill of Rights, itself
originally omitted because self-evident, incorporates in intent the "natural"
heritage of the individual citizen.
How far this, as a philosophy, affected in that day our governmental
law, is beyond my power to say. But as applied to private law, the r6le of
the philosophy of natural law is dear. Precedents were few. Judges had
neither training nor experience at their back. England was hated. Law-
yers were only by accident accomplished, nor was their standing high. And
yet, there were disputes. And courts. And lawyers. Meanwhile, with a
rapidity no man (save one) had courage to prefigure, the country
rushed westward and spawned progeny. A call for law, for changing law,
for law fitted to conditions in good part theretofore unknown, was met
by a lack of materials to answer the call. There was a single body of
law available in English: the common law tradition. Yet that tradition
(though pressed, increasingly as time went on, by advocates) was distrusted
by the populace. Consider Tory-expulsion, the French Revolution, and
the War of 1812. And partly the tradition was ill-adapted to our needs.
If ever situation cried out for one particular philosophy, this did. Natural
law! The law which urges Reason as the law. The judge, if his experience
reaches, has but to think, to see, and to decree as seen. The English cases-
merely, in tacit theory, as suggestions-proceed to suggest; and by suggest-
ing, to relieve; and as reliefs, to become received. For one can always vary
from them, when the case requires. Story and Kent, in search of variant
suggestion, can range among the Continental writers. Until the growing re-
ception of English practice as well (along with English precedents) threatens
to wall in variant growth, instinct and theory of right reason continue to
correct reception of the English law.
Thus up to the '5os. As the slavery controversy draws off attention,
I lose the trail of growth in private law. Indeed, as I look back over my
own fields of work, it is a little startling to see the incidence of the creative
precedents which I happen to have met halt in the late '4os, disappear during
the '5os, and set in again as the '7os approach. I speak of course from cas-
ual observation, not from careful inquiry. But, in conjunction with the
towering of the slavery issue, the doubt impends whether private law, along
with other lines of interest, may not have suffered stagnation as the powers
of a nation were channeled toward one crucial conflict.
But whatever the doubt before the Civil War, there is none after.
Grant, and the nadir of political corruption. In New York, Tweed. In the
South, Reconstruction. Union Pacific Railway-why go on? The era of
the business buccaneer. Natural resources. A continent to be exploited.
Fortune ahead, fist in your neighbor's belly, foot in his face, immigrants,
and consumers, and the earth-and law-to be exploited. In this period, as
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I see it, the Business Man took hold of the ideology of America. While
business began to center on industrialization, with corporate development
in an ascending scale as the inevitable consequence. One thing must be re-
membered. "Hold of the ideology of America," was what I said. "Cap-
tain of Industry", the slogan ran. National welfare was identified with
laisse-faire-and with some reason. Not only were we growing, not only
was-for most-the standard of living rising, but the business buccaneers
(as contrasted, I suspect, with the political or the financial) were giving
the country more than value received. The elder J. P. Morgan perhaps (and
at times) excepted, Rockefellers, Harrimans and Hills, as doers, stood out
in startling contrast to such stockjobbers as a Gould.
It is against this background that we approach the philosophy that un-
derlay the private law between 187o and, say, 19oo. Little thereof was
explicit. It was no day for too explicit philosophizing. Men's minds were
on doing, which meant exploitation. Yet the trend is obvious. "Natural
law" had built up, in the course of the decades, its precedents, and borrow-
ing from England had acclimatized the precedent system in two or three
of its multiform variants. And business captains needed a stable footing
in the law. Stable: that means, on the one hand, reckonable. So, let us say,
with reference to the law of long-term contracts or of property. Stable:
that means, on the other hand, sufficiently straitjacketed in out-moded
moulds not to catch up too fast with novel predatory practices. Footing
to foot on, plus room to move in: these were the needs the dominant philoso-
phy of life required. The dominant philosophy of law proceeded to supply
the needs, by way of case law. By way of decisions of judges, based on
decisions of the judges who had gone before them. Legislation? Buy it off!
(Or, as with the Union Pacific, buy it on.) The nadir, I believe I mentioned,
of political morality inside these boundaries.
And what philosophy may hope for acceptance and utilization, in such
a situation? Positivism. Let us forget "right reason"; let us forget the
bastard something known as morality; let us acknowledge merely the obvi-
ous fact, in law, that law as ss, is law. Justice may be an ideal; in actuality
it is an accident. A legal system exists to preserve the law as is, and any
other thinking is a somewhat absurd idealistic tendency, divorced from facts
of life.
It had happened meanwhile (thanks to the prior reception of English
practice) that this philosophy (explicit or implicit) was applied to a body
of case law. It had happened, further, that the body of American case law
itself had already been developed, with a philosophical presupposition of
natural law as nurse and guide. It had happened finally (as indeed was
inevitable) that particular cases ran discordant ways. Whence arose, in-
eluctably, the problem of dealing with discordant precedents. For precedents
are positive, each one of them.
ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW
The result was a confused but (to the dominant interested parties)
wholly satisfactory "resolution" of incompatible decisions. To wit: deci-
sions which we like are "sound", and therefore precedent. But decisions
which we do vot like are "unsound", and therefore to be disregarded. The
following of consistent precedents is a positivistic choice. The choice among
inconsistent precedents (say, "on principle") was, on the other hand, an echo
of the already decadent philosophy of immutable "natural law". Only in
later years has it tended to become mechanized in terms of "majority view",
or that of Corpus Juris; or been frankly based on policy.
To repeat, the system was one of precedent. Into a system of prece-
dent the urges from historical jurisprudence fit with no shock at all to the
prevailing positivism. The study of history merely "reveals" the prevailing
rule, or helps the natural law to make a choice among prevailing rules which
happen to conflict. Indeed the going back helps positivism mightily to di-
vorce law from the life around us.
The urge was thus for clarity and certainty, for a firm foundation.
The urge was for a solid something on which to build, of course, with the
aforesaid exception for extensions made necessary by business needs. These
extensions were provided by the selected bar. Selected? Selected by fees.
Throughout the period under consideration, the best brains of the bar were
in the service of the business captains, as the results attest. There was no
lack of growth of corporation law. The labor injunction was invented.
There was, as events proceeded, the turning of the trust to the uses which
have connected the word with oil and beef. The legal structure of high
financeering found willing carpenters as well as able architects.
Meantime the revolt of labor breaks into the public eye in '73, in the
'8os, and again and crucially in the Pullman strike of '93. The farmers,
from the resumption of specie payments in 1879, suffer the pinch, and push
for "easy money". The small business man in the late '8os, and loudly in
the '9os, cries out against the Trusts. Popular movements capture legis-
latures. No longer can all legislation be bought off. In the skilled hands
of corporation counsel, the front of battle shifts. A new utility is discov-
ered for "due process", and "equal protection of the laws". For this there
were no precedents. The prevailing positivism, explicit or implicit, gave
no footing. Again the approach was along the lines of natural law. Right
reasonz is the guide. The indefinite void marked by the phrasing of the
two amendments was filled by the judges' notions of the way things should
be-filled to the entire satisfaction of those persons whose ideology and ac-
tion indicated the proper way to fill it. Observe the ways of implicit phi-
losophy. Natural law in the constitutional field rides hand in hand with
positivism on the private side. Who cares for inconsistency? Both serve
the need-the need of those persons whose need, as things were organized,
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was "'the need". Observe also how an appeal to natural law which in the
first half-century was a vital source of creation could at the end become in
very truth the judicial "enactment of Mr. Herbert Spencer's social statics".
At this point it is time to look into the philosophy of one individual
whose phrasings have had power. As one follows the growth of Holmes'
thinking from his early writings in the American Law Review, through The
Common Law, into his speeches, and culminating with The Path of the
Law in 1896, one finds increasing precision in the development of a cynical
realism. It might be summed up as "Look and see precisely what is there;
and reckon with that, and nothing else". Or, as my friend Patterson pre-
fers to phrase it, the judge's attitude becomes: "You have not shown enough
to make me move". Even the splendid clarity of the contracts opinions
cannot hide the essential conservatism of the point of view-as applied to
private underlying law. The misrepresentation cases show no desire to ex-
pand. The torts cases are choked by ancient history. Even the celebrated
dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner I rests on unwillingness to create a prece-
dent, where the other judges were prepared to do so in the interest of a wan-
ing point of view. The very early essay on grain elevators is a notable
exception. It is striking as one works through Holmes' writings before the
appointment to the Supreme Court, to find an almost total absence of dis-
cussion on public law. I can recall only one passing reference in 1896.
Mark now how the philosophy thus developed, and without change in
its form, takes on a total difference in effect as the man moves into another
sphere of action. "Look and see precisely what is there"-and as applied
to constitutional limitations on legislation (as distinguished from the piled
up precedents of common law) the answer is only a non-existent brooding
omnipresence in the skies. Or, from the other angle: "You have not shown
enough to make me move"-this time, not in favor of the plaintiff, but to
strike down a statute. And what had been in effect a philosophy of con-
servatism becomes, without internal change, the "open sesame" of liberal
reform. Holmes does not take the initiative. The legislature will do that.
Holmes strikes down the barriers others would by new creation set up before
the legislature. Natural law cannot maintain its substance to a cynical eye.
We see thus exemplified the r6le of the single man in social change, and
the r6le of a philosophy once accepted, in the work of the single man. As
in all but exceptional instances, with a lag. It took twenty years to win the
Supreme Court to Holmes' point of view, and when it had been done there
came a setback. While his philosophy in private law has waited close to
sixty years to find acceptance. The acclaim that greeted The Common Law,
here and abroad, was not for the analytical insight we prize today, but for
its history.
3 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896).
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With the turn of the century the emotional revolt of laborers, farmers,
and small business men had worked its way up into the thinking of the
intellectuals. How far this is a parallel phenomenon to Roosevelt's pro-
gressivism, how far it was kindled from the political sphere, I have no
means of knowing. Certain it is that vital thinking of a peculiarly high
order appears in the first decade of the century. Dewey, James, Bentley,
Sumner, even Ross. And Veblen. And, on the legal side, Brandeis as early
as the '9os, Wigmore, the path-breaking work of Pound, Hohfeld and Cook,
and in I9IO and 1911 Bingham as the forerunner of realism.
On the private law side Pound's sociological jurisprudence represents
in essence a revolt against case law positivism, a re-introduction of ethics
into the law, and ethics with a vigorous social flavor. The critique of the
law is to proceed not from inside but from outside. Once again with a hang-
over of natural law thinking. For to discover social values one turns to
Reason in the armchair (and, with a hangover of positivism, to the cases
in the books), and to such desultory experience as he may have had about
the matter. Still, on the private law side, Pound, not Holmes, is the prophet
of the new dispensation. On the public law side, much more Holmes than
Pound.
But it will be observed that, as indicated at the outset, we have now
shifted the arena of discussion. No longer are we dealing with the implicit
philosophy of the law-men at large. We have begun to speak of individual
writers whose work is far from mirroring the action of their legal con-
temporaries in the bulk. The lag in the case of Holmes has been mentioned.
The lag in the case of Pound is hardly smaller. Not until Cardozo under-
took the job of re-interpretation of the fundamental point of view (begin-
ning in 1925) may one regard sociological jurisprudence as even beginning
to win general acceptance among the body of the guild.
This calls for explanation. The needs of the times were there, and felt.
Sociological jurisprudence ought, it would seem, to have found an early
echo. I find a number of factors to which one might appeal, yet have no
great confidence in any of them being operative. The "law" under discus-
sion was the law of the schools, and the law of the schools had for some
decades been divorced from life. That may have helped to pen the tempest
within the legal teapot. More important is probably that impatience called
for legislative-or administrative-change, and so focussed attention on
the constitutional field. It will be found, e. g., that widespread realism in
public law antedates realism among private law scholars by a good two
decades. But most important of all I suspect to be the fact that leaders
in legal practice had fallen hopelessly behind the times. Dominated by
bourgeois, business, buccaneer ideology, serving and knowing only, as
specialized office counsel, the interests of the "Ins", they had no ears for
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words that betokened change in an existing order. One still meets gen-
tlemen who still voice their profound conviction that such conservative men
as Holmes, or Brandeis, or Pound, are "dangerous".
Meantime, the spear-point had advanced. In the immediate post-war
years a goodly body of thinkers, stimulated especially by Dewey, Boas, Wat-
son, and Veblen, had begun to apply Holmes' way of seeing not only to the
law, but to sociological jurisprudence. To make the latter real required
more than armchair estimates. Pound and Frankfurter had indeed begun
the work in the Cleveland crime survey. A similar and more sustained
approach was required no less in private law. To apply the criterion of
judging law by its effects called for more exact knowledge both of what
law was and of what its effects might be. Indeed it called for more accu-
rate knowledge of the conditions of society. (Here it seems to me Brandeis
was in public law the major pioneer-at least in forcing facts before the
court.) Hence, "Realism". The mixture of philosophic tendencies in-
volved in that way of work is interesting. From the positivists, the realists
take the insistence on concrete data, though they largely increase the scope
of data to be insisted on. From Holmes (and Watson) they take a cynicism
of vision, an insistence on treating words as mere tools in attempting to
deal with things more tangible. From sociological jurisprudence they accept
the criterion of criticism by way of social needs. From Dewey and James
they take an insistence on results as the single test of validity.
As yet their views are hopelessly unorthodox. The profession at large
still shows, at times, the influence of the natural law of one hundred years
ago. More vitally its work is affected by the positivism that was at home
in 188o. Beginnings of the influence of sociological jurisprudence can be
seen in law-men's actions. The realists find as yet little echo among judges.
But what makes them seem a wedge that is opening up the future behavior
of the guild is that their lines of thinking are so much closer than any others
to the actual behavior of the better bar, and that their judgments of policy
come backed by facts.
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